Credit scoring : a historic recurrence in microfinance by Bumacov, Vitalie et al.
 
 
1 
 
Credit scoring – a historic recurrence in microfinance1 
 
Vitalie Bumacov, Oxford Brookes Business School, Oxford Brookes University, UK 
Arvind Ashta, CEREN, EA 7477, Burgundy School of Business - Université Bourgogne 
Franche-Comté, France 
Pritam Singh, Oxford Brookes Business School, Oxford Brookes University, UK. 
 
 
 
By synthesizing a range of insights based on a review of the literature on credit scoring 
in the developed world, we outline a conceptual framework of credit scoring that enables 
the use of this technique in micro lending, avoiding the pitfalls of the past. 
 
 
Key points 
 
Microfinance is a new credit segment that can benefit greatly from the advantages the 
credit scoring technique can offer. 
Since the credit scoring technique did not evolve fast enough to meet the needs of 
microfinance, its adoption by microfinance institutions is slow and resembles more a 
historic recurrence rather than a new historical stage. 
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Introduction 
Microcredit is the provision of credit facilities to poor and financially excluded people 
who hitherto were not being provided credit services except by money lenders and loan 
sharks at high interest rates ranging from 50 to over 1,000 percent per year (Wai, 1957). 
This appalling state of affairs was owing to asymmetric information about the 
creditworthiness of the borrowers, high relative transaction costs, borrowers’ lack of 
valuable collateral, and weakness of contract enforcement mechanisms (Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2005). The social innovation of microcredit has enabled a reduction of these 
interest rates to an average of about 28 percent per year (Rosenberg et al., 2009). 
 
The essential social innovation of the microcredit has been that of group lending. In one 
variant of this group lending model – the Nobel Prize winning Grameen Bank approach 
– the microfinance institution (MFI) first lends to two women in a group of five. If they 
repay, another two are given a loan and if all four repay, the fifth also receives a loan 
(Yunus, 2003). The inside information of the group members enables the MFI to avoid 
bad borrowers. Group members monitor, advise and help each other in matters dealing 
with the loans. The repayment of the micro loans is in public, thus further reducing 
transaction costs and moral hazard. Default rates reached surprisingly low levels in 
many big MFIs. Based on such low risks and high returns, microcredit has been 
growing at 20 to 30 percent per year being offered to millions of borrowers in poor 
countries, most being among the poorest (Maes & Reed, 2012; Reed, 2012; Reed et al., 
2014). 
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The gradual shift from group to individual lending has nurtured problems of loan 
repayment in many MFIs because the techniques of individual risk assessment lagged 
behind. Bad credit behavior may have led to aggressive actions on the part of lenders 
and social manifestations on the part of borrowers, some refusing to repay the loans as 
did the members of No pago! movement in Nicaragua. The legislator has often clamped 
down on the sector, as it happened in Andhra Pradesh, India. One technique that MFIs 
could use for safe individual lending on a large scale is credit scoring. 
 
The use of credit scoring in microfinance has the potential to improve market efficiency, 
but a large knowledge gap exists between the demand and supply of credit scoring 
solutions. To avoid the mistakes of the past, we present the history of credit scoring in 
developed countries, mainly USA, which were confronted with problems in providing 
credit similar to the ones faced by MFIs nowadays. Although several books present a 
history of credit scoring (Thomas, 2002; Anderson, 2007), none focused on the lessons 
microfinance practitioners and academics can extract from it. 
 
This paper divides the evolution of credit scoring into different historical periods, each 
presented in a different section based on the kind of subjects being studied 
predominantly in each period. We have characterized the time periods as early works, 
the commercial era of credit scoring for consumer credit, credit scoring for corporate 
lending, institutionalization, new dimensions of credit scoring, and microfinance era, 
with the latter looking more like a historic recurrence rather than a new historical stage.  
 
Early works  
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The set of studies in consumer “instalment” financing conducted by the US National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in the last years of the 1930s and published in 
1940 and 1941 represents the base on which credit scoring emerged. The NBER, a not-
for-profit organization, was engaged in researching and disseminating knowledge about 
essential economic facts. Installment financing was one important economic activity in 
the USA. Loans outstanding doubled from 1934 to 1938 (Chapman et al., 1940). 
 
Personal loans contributed significantly to the growth of consumer credit. A predecessor 
of the current micro loan, the amount at the end of the 1930s was generally limited to 
300 USD – the equivalent of about 5,200 USD in 2017 – in cash and maximum legal 
interest rates were between 24 and 42 percent per year, depending on the particular state 
in the USA where the transaction took place. The supply of personal loans was 
encouraged “to combat the loan-shark evil, which had arisen because the usury statutes 
prevented the profitable lending of small sums at legitimate rates” (Young et al., 1940, 
p. 1). This problem is current in numerous developing countries and microfinance was 
foreseen as the main tool to solve it. At that time the need to reduce transaction costs 
and enhance the appraisal of risks was obvious in a competitive environment.  
 
Another NBER study in installment financing presented the problems that were 
experienced by the lenders (Chapman et al., 1940). Credit providers were conscious that 
some attributes of the applicants were specific to bad borrowers and considered them in 
their subjective evaluation. Two broad indicators were important when judging a 
prospective credit risk: willingness and ability to repay the loan. Information on the 
income of the applicant, her net worth and other financial characteristics were predictors 
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of the ability to pay back, while the willingness to pay depended on the applicant’s 
character. 
 
“On the basis of experience, and to some extent intuition, the loan officer decides which 
applicants are more likely to default than others or which loans are likely to involve 
collection costs so great as to render the transaction unprofitable” (Chapman et al., 
1940, p. 109). “Lenders need to know the relative importance of as many credit risk 
factors as can be isolated, and in making a final decision on a loan application the 
responsible officer must give due weight to each factor” (Chapman et al., 1940, p. 137). 
The latter citation defines the banking issue that credit scoring is solving using 
empirical methods. A credit scoring algorithm contains all risk factors that could be 
identified and their weights – the relative importance of the risk factor in making the 
subject a bad credit. 
 
Based on samples of good and bad clients coming from different financial institutions, 
Chapman et al. (1940) found the most significant risk factors: possession of a bank 
account, stability of employment, nature of occupation, permanence of residence, 
ownership of real estate and industrial affiliation. They made an important qualifying 
remark about the sampling that poses challenges for researchers and practitioners even 
today. “Since these borrowers had already passed through a selection process at the 
hands of credit men, the sample cannot be considered completely representative of the 
general run of personal loan applicants” (Chapman et al., 1940, p. 111). This implied 
that the identification of risk factors was based on a previously screened sample of 
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accepted applicants which became consequently good or bad credit risks. The sample 
could not include applicants who had been refused. 
  
One other NBER study (Plummer & Young, 1940) went beyond identification of credit 
risk factors and presented functioning credit rating systems. The use of such systems 
was not uncommon in the USA in the late 1930s. In some cases a rating of good, fair or 
poor was entered for each factor considered as an indicator of credit risk. The final 
rating represented the average of favorable and unfavorable indications. “In other cases 
a specific grade is entered opposite each item and the sum of the grades serves as the 
index of credit risk” (Plummer & Young, 1940, p. 136). The use of such rating systems 
is still common today, especially in micro and small business lending, but we note that 
subjective attribution of weights to identified risk factors makes the technique distinct 
from credit scoring. Since empirics are not used in deriving the relative weights of risk 
factors, such techniques are generally referred as credit rating. 
 
The work of Durand (1941), in yet another NBER study, marked the first important step 
in the development of the technique of credit scoring. The author used a sample of 
7,200 consumer loans disbursed by 37 financial institutions which included commercial 
banks offering personal loans, personal finance companies, automobile finance 
companies and appliance financers. Available borrowers’ attributes were copied from 
their loan application forms. These included age, gender, marital status, dependents in 
the household, stability of employment, permanence of residence and other socio-
demographic variables. Also, borrowers’ assets and liabilities, and loan characteristics 
such as amount and number of instalments were available. No information was 
 
 
7 
 
collected on past credit behavior or on “matters like physical or mental health, which 
are certainly germane to risk problem, but which obviously do not lend themselves to 
analysis in a statistical study of credit risks” (Durand, 1941, p. 20).  
 
The crucial issue that Durand dealt with was the formulation of the concept of the credit 
scoring algorithm, which he called “credit-rating formula”. The formula combined the 
most important credit risk factors and respective relative weights. For the first time, 
identification of risk factors and calculation of their weights was performed empirically. 
When lenders were scoring the applicants for credit, the weights of risk factors were 
computed, yielding a sum: the “credit-rating” score. The score was used as the basis for 
accepting or rejecting loan applications. The advance and diffusion of the technique of 
statistical discrimination of populations (Fisher, 1936) played a key role in the 
emergence of credit scoring. 
 
Intuitive-subjective rating formulas had been created before and used in financial 
institutions. Durand “experimented with deriving purely objective credit formulae by 
statistical methods” (Durand, 1941, p. 84). He pointed out precisely the advantages of 
credit scoring – loan officers could assess ordinary loan applications faster and most of 
the routine evaluation work could be handled by less experienced and relatively low-
salaried personnel. Considering that most developing countries suffer from the epidemic 
of brain drain, the advantages of credit scoring should appeal to many microfinance 
providers and supervising bodies.  
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Durand identified several practical aspects to be considered in developing credit scoring 
algorithms. Two of them are particularly relevant for microfinance: size of the sample and 
the time frame. About the sampling size, he argued that though large samples were 
preferable, since collecting thousands of cases could be impossible or too expensive, a 
sample as small as one hundred good and one hundred bad loans might be adequate for 
statistical significance. Since many MFIs experience problems with data collection on a 
large scale due to bad databases or lack of management information systems (MIS), this 
suggestion of one hundred good and one hundred bad loans in the sample is feasible 
within the microfinance reality. 
 
About the time frame problem, Durand remarked that risk experience associated with 
different factors may alter with time. One such example could be the stability of 
employment. Changing employers too often has been commonly associated with 
workplace problems and subsequent financial uncertainty. However, in today’s work 
environment changing employers could be associated with exceptional skills required 
for ad hoc, sophisticated and well-remunerated projects. Durand’s solution to the time 
frame problem was to limit the study to recent homogeneous periods. Good and bad 
credit risks being included in the sample had to be recent. Further we use the term 
‘training sample’ to identify the set of good and bad credit risk profiles used to develop 
the credit scoring algorithm. 
 
Durand made the interesting remark that in practice it was difficult to make a precise 
distinction between confirmed good and bad loans. If the net revenue from a loan did 
not cover the expenses it generated, it was certainly a bad loan. If the principal and 
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interest were repaid in full and on time, it was a good loan. The problem was with grey 
cases where borrowers paid late. The financial institution collected penalty fees to 
compensate delinquency-related costs, such as reminders and specific supervision, but 
these fees did not always cover all costs. Since it was expensive to determine accurately 
at what level of delinquent credit behavior a loan ceased to be profitable, Durand 
proposed several rules to define bad credits: “loan was more than 90 days delinquent; 
comaker [cosigner] paid all or part of loan after demand by bank; legal action was 
taken; loan was charged off” (Durand, 1941, p. 38). Currently, many microfinance 
institutions use the same rules when defining bad borrowers. In some markets however, 
where micro borrowers make weekly repayments, 30 days delinquency – the equivalent 
of four missed installments – is the preferred definition of a bad credit risk (Simbaqueba 
et al., 2011).  
 
Durand reiterated the remarks of Chapman et al. (1940) about the limitations of the 
sample due to initial screening of applicants by the loan officers. To overcome this 
problem, Durand suggested that financial institutions would initially use the scoring 
algorithm as a supplementary evaluation tool after the usual screening by the loan 
officers. Thereafter experimental loans had to be disbursed by lowering temporarily and 
progressively the approval standards of the loan officers in order to gain new experience 
about the behavior of applicants that were accepted by credit scoring but would have 
been refused by the loan officers under normal circumstances. Such a solution could 
temporarily increase losses but will provide new experience for developing better credit 
scoring algorithms which should free the loan officer from the task of screening 
standard applications. 
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Later on, researchers and practitioners proposed alternative techniques that were easier 
to implement. For example Hand & Henley (1993) proposed the reject inference 
method. This involves inferring the credit risk class of rejected applicants – rejected 
applicants with profiles similar to bad credit risks would be considered bad borrowers 
and rejected applicants with profiles similar to good credit risks would be considered 
good borrowers – and including theses profiles in the training sample. Nevertheless, this 
method also does not completely resolve the problem of biased samples, unless credit is 
provided to a representative sample of applicants that would have been rejected by the 
loan officer but approved by the credit scoring algorithm. 
 
It follows from the discussion above that for developing a credit scoring algorithm a 
representative training sample of good and bad borrowers is needed. One needs to know 
their detailed profiles: the more characteristics the better. Data has to be structured, so 
that statistical methods can be used to identify risk factors and their relative weights. 
These weights are used to generate a credit score, which based on a certain cut-off, 
indicates the acceptance or the rejection of the scored applicant. Obviously, statistics 
may contradict some subjective ways of thinking. For example Durand (1941) had 
discovered that women tended to be good risks, much to the surprise of some lenders 
who were convinced of the contrary view. This has also been found to be true in 
microfinance and MFIs in many countries lend predominantly to women. 
 
Durand found another counter-intuitive discovery – for personal loans, there was no 
direct relationship between the credit risk and the income level of the borrower. This 
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finding highlighting the fact that not all poor persons are bad credit risks stands at the 
foundation of microfinance (Dowla & Barua, 2006). 
 
The revolutionary approach of Durand took some time to become known to scholars 
and financial institutions. That explains why there were no other academic publications 
covering the topic of credit scoring till the 1960s. 
 
The commercial era of credit scoring for consumer credit 
The next stage in the evolution of credit scoring was its use on a commercial basis. 
Consumer lending grew in the USA, affecting large segments of the public, to the point 
that this growth became unsustainable. Myers & Forgy (1963) stated that increasing 
demand for credit pushed many financial institutions to expand beyond their capacities 
to train and maintain experienced loan officers. In such conditions, the role of credit 
scoring became critically important. In recent years, in many developing countries, for 
example Morocco, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Nicaragua, micro lending experienced 
similar unsustainable high growth, leading to over-indebtedness and consequent 
degradation of the market (Constantinou & Ashta, 2010). We think that credit scoring 
could have played a positive role in reducing the default rate of micro borrowers. 
 
Myers and Forgy developed several scorecards using one training sample of good and 
bad credit risks coming from one financial institution. This was different from Durand 
who had combined risks from different financial institutions. They used diverse 
statistical and non-statistical techniques to construct scorecards and then compared their 
predictive effectiveness. 
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Myers and Forgy enriched the conceptual framework of credit scoring by introducing 
the concept of a holdout sample, although they acknowledged that the idea was based 
on an unpublished thesis by Wolbers H. L. of 1949. The holdout sample was a sub-
sample obtained by withholding a part of the available information before developing 
the credit scoring algorithm. They developed the algorithm using the training sample 
and tested it on the holdout sample. In the current literature the term test sample has 
replaced the holdout sample. It is used to validate the robustness of the scorecard. 
 
Being assisted by a computer, Myers and Forgy were able to experiment with different 
approaches to construct scorecards. In addition to the discriminant analysis used by 
Durand, they employed stepwise regression, the credit rating method of equal weights 
for identified risk factors, and double-discriminant analysis. Double-discriminant 
analysis gave the most satisfactory results. This method first required scoring of good 
and bad loans using the scorecard developed under the first approach – discriminant 
analysis – then the scorecard was redeveloped using only good and bad borrowers that 
received low scores – high credit risk. The purpose was to improve risk discrimination 
at ranges where good borrowers and bad borrowers have similar low scores. 
 
Myers and Forgy found that a smaller number of risk factors (12) will predict almost as 
well as all (21) identified relevant factors. This is an important finding when the cost of 
collecting information is relatively high, as in most microfinance environments. 
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Myers and Forgy acknowledged the importance of the face validity of the algorithm as 
perceived by the final users. The financial institution that provided the data for the 
research chose to implement one of the developed formulas, but not the most predictive 
one, which was disregarded by the management due to bizarre weights of some risk 
factors. 
 
Smith (1964) proposed a different approach to construct credit scoring algorithms. He 
suggested adding together bad account probabilities corresponding to each measured 
attribute (characteristic) of the applicant and considering the sum as the final credit 
score. These conditional probabilities measure the odds of a loan being a bad credit 
given certain attributes. The probabilities, all positive, were calculated using the training 
sample. If 25 in 100 borrowers who owned family cars were bad credit risks while those 
without cars were 50 bad risks in 100 and if 20 married borrowers in 100 were bad 
risks, while single borrowers were 40 bad risks in 100, then a married applicant who 
was owning a car would receive a tiny score of 25/100 + 20/100 = 45/100, while a 
single applicant without a car would score the double 50/100 + 40/100 = 90/100. 
 
Smith introduced the practice of multiplying these probabilities by 1,000 for easier 
computing of the sum and clearer interpretation of the results. This multiplication by 
1,000 was consequently adopted by the industry. Applied to the example given above, 
this practice would give 450 points for the credit riskiness of the married applicant with 
a car and 900 points for the applicant who is single and without a car. Today’s practice 
is to have the scores indicating creditworthiness – higher the score, lower the credit risk. 
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The methodology proposed by Smith is simple and clear because it uses simplifying 
assumptions and is thus not easily amenable to empirical investigation. Such 
methodology can still be used in credit granting but in our judgment, due to its weak 
empirical foundations, it should not be termed credit scoring. An even more serious 
weakness is found in the third technique proposed by Myers & Forgy (1963) which 
supposed giving equal weights for identified risk factors, however, the cost of such bias 
might be significantly lower than the opportunity cost of not using any tool to estimate 
the credit risk. Many micro and small business lenders do not use credit scoring because 
statistics look too complicated to them. If simpler techniques can motivate micro 
lenders in using algorithms for credit granting, then benefits from reduction of 
transaction and delinquency costs would probably cover the costs associated with bias. 
 
Smith made a valuable contribution in suggesting that the rejected applicants should 
also be subjected to credit scoring in order to judge the robustness of the credit scoring 
algorithm and possibly to overcome the bias which resulted in the first instance when 
differentiating between selected and rejected applicants. If the scoring algorithm 
rejected most of applicants that were turned down by the loan officers, then such 
algorithm could immediately replace the loan officer in treating standard loan 
applications. If, however, the algorithm failed to do so, it had to be used initially as a 
supplementary tool until the missing information on the credit behavior of refused 
applicants would be gathered, as proposed by Durand. 
 
Weingartner (1966) attributed the increasing use of credit scoring in the USA to the 
growing availability of “electronic” computers. He observed that financial institutions 
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were still granting loans to applicants with higher credit risk, provided they were above 
the rejection cut-off, but these loans were smaller in amount and shorter in maturity. His 
study did not examine the aspect of risk-based pricing in the form of differential rates of 
interest charged to such low-scoring applicants, but the appearance of the practice of 
risk-based adjustments of loan conditions should be mentioned. 
 
Weingartner highlighted the importance of performing pilot tests before credit scoring 
was used by the institution. He suggested initially testing newly emerging delinquent 
accounts to observe if they would have received low scores at the time of application.  
 
Weingartner’s work, for the first time in the literature, showed the importance of field 
trials. His procedure involved the use of credit scoring first by only a few loan officers 
or by only one branch out of the entire network. The procedure was intended for 
“training as well as for ironing out difficulties that arise” (Weingartner, 1966, p. 52) 
and, in that sense, though not a constituent of the conceptual framework of the credit 
scoring, it is a potentially useful optional procedure. 
 
Post-implementation reports certainly are a constituent part of the conceptual 
framework of credit scoring. Weingartner proposed a continuous “barometer” that 
would measure the average score that would reflect the quality of new disbursed credits. 
The trend would indicate the quality of newly engaged portfolio over time. In the same 
way the overall quality of refused applications could be observed. Significant 
fluctuations registered by the barometer would indicate changes in the population of 
applicants – a warning sign. 
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Research tendencies by the mid-1960s included efforts to build algorithms that would 
predict the profitability of the loan, rather than the delinquency or default (Greer, 1967). 
After Hassler et al. (1963) provided evidence that current repayment records show 
strong ability to identify bad risks, Weingartner (1966) popularized the proposal to use 
the credit scoring technique in loan collection procedures. Collection scoring is useful in 
credit financing since it identifies current borrowers that are more likely to repay after 
being delinquent. In this way the financial institution can target them with appropriate 
collection actions and obtain certain return. Since the lender has already provided the 
borrower with a loan, collection scoring does not belong to the conceptual framework of 
credit scoring. 
 
To sum up, it is clear that Durand (1941) laid the foundations of credit scoring but left 
unexplored areas, some of which were addressed by Meyers & Forgy (1963). Smith 
(1964) contributed to a practical use of credit scoring and Weingartner (1966) 
introduced pilot and post-implementation tests. Further improvement on their work and 
the first description of the implementation and functioning of a credit scoring system in 
a financial institution in the USA was provided in a path-breaking paper by Boggess 
(1967). This provides a comprehensive picture to conclude that the main traits of the 
conceptual framework of modern consumer credit scoring were set by the mid-1960s. 
Today this framework can be used by MFIs interested in implementing credit scoring.   
 
Boggess explained that the financial institution he studied implemented a credit scoring 
system in 1964 in which loan applications were automatically scored by a computer if 
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policy limits were respected. Within 24 hours the credit department was accepting or 
rejecting the loan application based on the credit score. Earlier, this task required up to 
one week. “The company cut bad debt losses enough to realize a 1.5 million [USD] 
profit improvement on more than 100 million [USD] in sales in the first full year of the 
system’s operation” (Boggess, 1967, p. 121). Computerized MIS elements combined 
with the virtues of credit scoring gave the lender the possibility to operate procedures 
that adapted the strategy of the company to shifts in the population of loan applicants. 
The financial institution was developing a new scoring formula every six months and 
was tracking changes in the weights of risk factors over time. 
 
In Figure 1 we have captured the continuous process of development and use of credit 
scoring. 
 
 
[Figure 1 here]: The conceptual framework of credit scoring as it existed during the 
mid-1960s. 
 
 
The Population box in Figure 1 indicates the process of selecting the training, test and 
reject samples. The Algorithm box indicates the process of developing a credit scoring 
algorithm after required samples have been selected from the population and relevant 
data have been extracted and structured. This box includes the sub-boxes Empirics, 
Scoring Formula, Distribution and Cut-off. These sub-boxes are separate for parametric 
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credit scoring algorithms, which are based on scorecards. For non-parametric credit 
scoring algorithms these sub-boxes are welded in an all-in-one block. 
 
The Empirics sub-box indicates that for developing the algorithm a statistical technique 
has to be selected. All the statistical techniques that can be used to derive the algorithm 
belong to the group of multivariate statistical analysis. The algorithm attempts to model 
post factum risk performance of the borrowers using certain information available at the 
time of loan appraisal. We assume that a perfect algorithm, which identifies all the bad 
and all the good risks in the training and test samples, can be developed if the totality of 
factors that determine the performance of these loans can be observed and measured, 
and the influence of each factor can be isolated and mathematically represented. Setting 
the rejection cut-off in a perfect credit scoring algorithm is simple: it is the lowest score 
observed in good risks. All bad risks obviously score below that level. When using only 
a few factors – the ones that can be accurately captured by the loan application and 
structured for computation purposes – the resulting algorithms are less accurate. One 
can observe that some bad risks have higher scores than the good risks. Nevertheless 
such algorithms have high utility as the share of bad risks outweighs the share of good 
risks in low scores and vice-versa.  
 
The sub-box Scoring formula indicates that all identified credit risk factors and their 
relative weights are grouped in a credit scoring formula – the scorecard. It will be used 
to score future applicants. The robustness of the credit scoring formula is tested using 
the test sample and if necessary the reject sample. The Distribution sub-box indicates 
that scores of past applicants that are already known to be good or bad credit risks 
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(contained in the test and training samples) are compared with their credit risk status 
(good or bad). One should observe that bad credit risks systematically receive low 
scores and good credit risks systematically receive high credit scores. The credit scoring 
distribution indicates the share of bad credit risks to good credit risks for a specific 
score or score range. The share of bad credit risks decreases as the credit score 
increases. The credit scoring distribution will serve as the scale by which future 
applicants will be judged. The Cut-off sub-box concerns the selection of a cut-off score 
that will correspond to the threshold. Applicants with scores above will be accepted 
because they are considered good credit risks. Applicants below will be refused because 
they are considered bad credit risks. Financial institutions may choose to have a grey 
score area in between the good and bad credit risks. Loan applications which fall in the 
grey area are scrutinized by the loan officers who decide if they accept or reject the loan 
application. The reject sample is used to observe if the credit scoring algorithm screens 
out most of the previously refused applicants. 
 
The Use box indicates that when credit scoring is used, the credit decision has to be 
consistent with the outcome of the credit scoring algorithm. Overrides should not 
happen. If the loan officer disregards the output of the credit scoring algorithm, the 
decision has to be justified. The results of such decisions have to be analyzed, especially 
when the risk class, good or bad, of accepted through override applicants is revealed. 
 
The Control box is to check if the algorithm is still appropriate with time. If tests 
indicate deterioration of discrimination power or shifts in the population of applicants, it 
is necessary to develop a new credit scoring algorithm. Once the accepted applicants 
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pay back their loans or register delinquencies, they reveal their credit risk class. Such 
new cases come to enrich the population of applicants with known credit risk. These 
cases are used afterwards to keep the credit scoring algorithm up to date. In fact, credit 
scoring algorithms built by using artificial intelligence can learn and adjust themselves 
constantly as new experience of using credit scoring becomes available. In such cases, 
the Algorithm box in Figure 1 covers also the dashed area – the boxes Use, Control and 
Population. 
 
Credit scoring for corporate lending 
While credit scoring was the exclusive domain of consumer credit, Altman (1968) 
employed the discriminant analysis approach to predict corporate bankruptcy using 
financial ratios as credit risk factors. He did not take into account other important 
attributes such as business-demographic characteristics like the age of the business or 
professional experience of the management. Other potential risk factors such as the 
purpose of the loan, maturity and guarantees were not considered either. In spite of its 
potential for estimating bad credit risk, Altman recommended the use of the algorithm 
as a supplement procedure in screening potential bad credit risks. 
 
This contribution to the conceptual framework of credit scoring is important as it opens 
it for use in business loans. Altman enlarged the framework to include firms in addition 
to individuals. Obviously the attributes that describe firms are different, although some 
overlap may exist, for example age, address and value of owned assets.  
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Orgler (1970), inspired in part by the work of Altman (1968), focused on the use of the 
credit scoring technique in current commercial loans. His scope excluded loan approval, 
addressing only the periodic review of the quality of already disbursed loans. He made 
the interesting remark that business borrowers form less homogeneous populations 
compared with consumer borrowers. This problem had not yet been addressed in the 
academic literature. Since then, the condition of homogeneity of the targeted population, 
considered by practitioners and academics to be implicit in consumer credit, became 
part of the framework of credit scoring. Orgler concluded that commercial borrowers 
were so diverse and their loan products so varied in terms of maturity, amount and 
security, that the application of credit scoring for loan approval would be less 
appropriate. The main advantages of the technique were seen in releasing loan officers’ 
time from routine evaluation of all current credits and allocating it to the small 
proportion of loans that would be identified by the scoring tool as deteriorating. 
 
As formulated briefly by Altman (1968) and more in detail by Orgler (1970), the use of 
credit scoring to measure the evolution of the credit risk during the course of a loan was 
certainly new and useful for the industry, given that corporate loans had longer 
maturities and meantime changes could affect seriously their credit risk. During the loan 
reimbursement new information, especially on repayment behavior, came in regularly to 
enrich the known profile of the borrower. Credit scoring algorithms could integrate such 
rich data in predicting default even more accurately, but since the credit risk could not 
be avoided as the money had been already lent, the technique could not be 
accommodated by the conceptual framework of credit scoring, as in the case of 
collection scoring. 
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The distinction between consumer and corporate loans tends to lose its significance in 
microfinance. Since microcredit addresses generally poor and self-employed people, the 
borrower is at the same time the person applying for the loan, the household of this 
person and this person’s small informal income-generation activity, all in one. The 
person – the applicant, and the firm – the business, are in general evaluated together in 
microfinance. Several scholars, including Orgler, cited the dissertation of Ewert of 1968 
that proposed a credit scoring formula to be used by wholesale distributors in granting 
trade credit to retail stores. As the stores were mostly sole-proprietor small firms 
needing trade credit in amounts similar to consumer credit, the formula used a 
combination of risk factors describing the company – legally responsible for the loan, 
and the owner. 
 
From this experience, we will note that the profile of the owner of the business as well 
as the profile of the business itself may be important in predicting credit risk, especially 
in small companies where personal and corporate property confounds. This is certainly 
the case of micro lending. Informal business contributes to blurring the limits between 
the natural person and the business. 
 
Institutionalization 
The early 1970s saw the credit scoring industry grow. Fair Isaac and Company (FICO), 
which sold the first commercially built credit scoring algorithm in 1958, started its 
collaboration with Wells Fargo – a major financial institution in the USA. The credit 
scoring provider was prospecting the exportation of the technique to Europe (Fair Isaac 
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Corporation, 2017). An increasing amount of academic literature dealt with different 
practical and theoretical topics related to the credit scoring technique. Emphasis was put 
on costs and net present value of loan repayments (Edmister & Schlarbaum, 1974), on 
best statistical techniques to be used (Muchinsky, 1975a), as well as on better definition 
of good and bad credit risks (Muchinsky, 1975b). 
 
Some serious works were addressing the use of credit scoring in low-income 
populations in the USA. Tabor & Bowers (1977) stated that credit scoring systems are 
not appropriate for evaluating low-income consumers, while Sexton (1975) found that 
only a few risk factors differentiated between high-income and low-income households, 
and thus could not conclude that specific algorithms for different income categories 
were necessary.  
 
In microfinance, the debate on the suitability of credit scoring is far from over. There 
are academics (Schreiner, 2000; Rayo Canton et al., 2010; Bumacov et al., 2014) and 
practitioners (Kortenbusch & Hauser, 2010; Simbaqueba et al., 2011) that argue in 
favor of the adoption of credit scoring by the MFIs while others are against (Balke, 
2005). 
 
The debate over the use of credit scoring in low-income populations in the USA was 
triggered by the report of the US National Commission on Consumer Finance (1972), 
which had questioned the feasibility of a credit scoring system applicable to low-income 
consumers and concluded that factors most likely to discriminate the credit risk of low-
income consumers were excluded from standard loan application forms. 
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Muchinsky (1975b) found that two opposite aspects of the borrower’s repayment 
behavior were critical to its classification as good or bad credit risk. One was 
delinquency. The other was the early repayment of the loan. A premature 
reimbursement was susceptible of making the account unprofitable because it led to the 
loss of potential interest. This new element modified the perception of what constituted 
a bad credit risk. 
 
The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 facilitated the extension of credit to low-
income clients and added legitimacy to the concept of credit scoring in the USA. The 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, with the amendments of 1976, had also notable 
implications. This law prohibited discrimination in the granting of credit on the basis of 
race, religion, gender, marital status and age. These ethical concerns were formalized in 
a legal setup and in this way constrained the conceptual framework of credit scoring in 
the USA. 
 
The in-house knowhow character of credit scoring systems used by the financial 
institutions represented an increasing problem for scholars, who found it difficult to 
relate and research how well the US industry incorporated new tendencies and legal 
requirements into practice. The new regulation required that statistically sound scoring 
systems be constructed using empirical methodologies, but no precise standards were 
imposed. The hypothetical obligation to demonstrate the soundness of a scoring system 
in Court made scholars focus on different technical aspects and assumptions that were 
ignored before, as long as the algorithm showed evidence of credit risk discrimination. 
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In the absence of case studies, Eisenbeis (1978) analyzed the credit scoring algorithms 
developed by academics at that time, hoping that these reflected the systems in use by 
lenders. Since the majority of the scorecards were developed using discriminant 
analysis, he pointed out the limitations of the technique and warned the public on the 
risks of ignoring the inherent statistical assumptions. 
 
With the emergence of credit bureaus selling information on past credit performance of 
potential borrowers, the cost of extra information was considered in different credit 
granting schemes (Eisenbeis, 1978). If a scoring formula predicted credit risk accurately 
using fewer risk factors, as observed by Meyers & Forgy (1963), there was no point in 
paying for the extra information. On the other hand, if additional information could help 
discriminate better loan applications near the cut-off limits, then extra costs were clearly 
justified. Academics were investigating how credit scoring algorithms could 
accommodate these options. 
 
Credit reporting is either new in many developing countries or non-existent (Doing 
Business, 2016). More than that, in countries where private or public credit reporting 
systems exists, these exclude microfinance institutions. This is unfortunate because 
credit reporting data is widely used in credit scoring algorithms. 
 
Ang et al. (1979) were among the first to build a non-parametric credit scoring system. 
They applied the decision tree technique to a training sample with good and bad credit 
risks. The result was a tree-like scheme where risk factors did not have weights but 
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acted like nodes and branches indicating at the end if the applicant was a potential good 
or bad credit risk. 
 
Use of automatic interaction detector analysis confirmed that the relationships between 
late payments and some borrower attributes were nonlinear (Ang et al., 1979). Take the 
example of a continuous variable such as age. Most would expect to see credit risk 
diminishing with age as borrowers become more experienced. In some credit segments, 
however, older borrowers pay better until a certain age when their credit behavior starts 
to worsen and resemble the behavior of young borrowers. Linear credit scoring models 
have a disadvantage in such situations. 
 
Since the technique of decision trees belongs to the class of statistical multivariate 
analysis, the conceptual framework of credit scoring did not change. We note that 
besides discriminant analysis and regressions, which became popular at the end of the 
1970s, a myriad of parametric and non-parametric statistical techniques was used in 
identifying good and bad credit risks (Häuβler, 1979). 
 
We conclude that by the end of 1970s, credit scoring was a recognized industry. The 
concept found its first use in Europe, being implemented by FICO in a bank in 1977 
(Fair Isaac Corporation, 2017). The company had by that time delivered approximately 
five hundred systems to approximately two hundred customers, including half of the 
fifty largest US banks, according to the testimony of William Fair – head of FICO, 
during hearings required by a Senate Commission (U.S. Senate, 1979). 
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New dimensions of credit scoring  
From the perspective of the 1980s, looking back at the adoption in 1974 of the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act which was originally perceived as a threat to credit scoring, we 
have a different view. Since the use of discriminatory factors was prohibited, many 
feared an overall reduction in predictive power of scoring systems in spite of some 
research findings (Nevin & Churchill, 1979) that showed no impact of the constraints 
imposed by the law. However, since judgmental systems were strongly criticized as 
subjective and thus prone to stronger discrimination by loan officers, credit scoring had 
to gain. Credit scoring was objective by definition and, under the new law, was 
considered respectful of ethical issues. 
 
Capon (1982), one of the strongest opponents of the use of “brute force empiricism” in 
credit scoring, remarked that algorithms in use in the USA included factors with no 
obvious or possible logical relationship to the creditworthiness of the applicant. Other 
factors directly related to the capacity to pay back a loan, such as the income of the 
applicant, were often ignored. With computers becoming more popular and powerful, 
and statistical packages becoming more user-friendly and affordable, many practitioners 
engaged in a “wild West” conquest of predictive risk factors or in a search for 
surrogates of prohibited discriminatory factors. 
 
In parallel, the credit bureau industry grew, supported by continuous expansion of the 
consumer credit market. Databases expanded in volume and complexity of information 
gathered. In 1981, FICO introduced the first credit bureau score (Fair Isaac Corporation, 
2017). For an additional fee, the inquiring financial institution would henceforth receive 
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not only the existing credit record of the applicant but also a credit score. The “bureau 
score” could be used solely or in combination with the institution’s appraisal result in 
deciding whether to grant the credit or not. 
 
A new concept called “expert system” was supposed to have serious implications in the 
credit business, particularly in consumer credit. Backed up by developments in the IT 
industry, expert systems were software designed to imitate the way of thinking of 
human expert (Holsapple et al., 1988). However, the expert system technique remains 
judgmental and not empirically founded – a sine qua non condition for a credit scoring 
system. Nevertheless, the advantage of cyber loan officers consisted in the possibility of 
providing a credit decision in real time or much faster than a loan officer, leaving to the 
later the task of treating non-standard applications. Cyber loan officers that can be 
reached by phone or through Internet have strong potential in cutting transaction costs 
in microfinance, especially in remote areas where it takes a lot of effort and time to 
reach to a branch of financial institution.     
 
Credit scoring principles progressively invaded other banking and non-banking sectors 
such as detection of fraud with credit cards (Rutledge, 1996; Bolton & Hand, 2002), 
direct marketing (Thrasher, 1992), or credit performance (Crook et al., 1992). We 
argue, however, that use of the technique outside credit granting remains beyond the 
scope of the conceptual framework of credit scoring. On the other hand, the application 
of the scoring technique in approving loans to small and medium businesses (SMEs) 
and mortgage loans enriched the framework. In 1995, FICO developed a credit scoring 
tool for granting credit to SMEs. The concept of pooled data was introduced to solve the 
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problem of heterogeneity of profiles of small and medium businesses (Fair Isaac 
Corporation, 2017). 
 
Microfinance era 
In many countries around the world the informal and semi-formal sectors represent 
important shares of the GDP (Harriss-White, 2003). There are lots of people employed 
in the informal economy who need financial services. Microfinance is a possible answer 
to a majority of these needs. 
 
As microcredit evolved from group to individual lending, Viganò (1993) studied the 
applicability of credit scoring in less developed countries proving the usefulness of the 
technique in granting credit to small and micro firms in Burkina Faso. After consumer, 
SME and corporate finance, credit scoring entered microfinance. It was later recognized 
as one important technique that may affect micro credit (Rhyne & Christen, 1999). 
 
Schreiner (2000) concluded that credit scoring for microfinance can work, but 
highlighted certain differences compared to its use in mainstream finance. The most 
important difference he found was in the information available for decision making in 
financing poor borrowers. In a typical microfinance setting, information is usually 
qualitative and informal, while credit scoring algorithms need quantitative inputs. The 
new challenge of credit scoring was then to adapt to this constraint.  
 
A study shows that MFIs which manage to adopt credit scoring have more productive 
loan officers and by consequence have bigger impact on the financial inclusion of the 
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poor (Bumacov et al., 2014). Unfortunately the credit scoring adoption rate in MFIs 
remains low and current debates suggest that credit scoring history repeats itself in 
microfinance instead of immediately flowing with the mainstream. Repetition of past 
mistakes generates inefficiencies. These mistakes can be avoided if microfinance 
institutions apply the conceptual framework presented in this paper. 
 
At the same time, microfinance has permitted scoring techniques to go into new areas. It 
is in the context of microfinance that the concept of poverty scoring emerged 
(Schreiner, 2010). Similar to credit scoring, poverty scoring estimates a person’s 
chances of being poor without measuring her income and wealth, but observing several 
easy-measurable factors. It is argued that using  credit scoring and poverty scoring 
together, an MFI can avoid both economic failure and mission drift – tendency to serve 
richer clients while ignoring the poor (Bumacov, 2012). Since poverty scoring does not 
estimate the credit risk, it lies outside the conceptual framework of credit scoring.  
 
Recommendations 
By synthesizing a range of insights from the literature review, in this paper we construct 
a conceptual framework of credit scoring that accommodates the use of the techniques 
in micro lending as well as in any new homogeneous credit market. The aim of this 
framework is to avoid a historic recurrence and bring the use of credit scoring in 
microfinance into the mainstream quickly. 
 
 
 
31 
 
The conceptual framework of credit scoring includes the scope, the population, the 
definition of bad credit risks, the profile of the applicant, statistical multivariate 
analysis, the algorithm and ethics. 
 
The scope of credit scoring is to help granting credit to safe borrowers. To avoid bad 
credit risks, credit scoring uses empirics. Credit scoring algorithms estimate the future 
classification of applicants as good or bad credit risks using revealed applicants’ 
profiles. Applicants belong necessarily to a homogeneous and massive population. The 
algorithm is derived using a statistical multivariate analysis technique that allows 
identifying risk factors and respective weights using a training sample that is composed 
of recent borrowers whose status as good or bad credit risk is known. The profiles of 
these borrowers are also known. The credit scoring assumption is that loan applicants 
will have a credit behavior like past borrowers with similar profiles. Due to the fact that 
past borrowers have already been screened by loan officers during approval, the 
population with known credit risk status is biased. If the credit scoring algorithm does 
not screen out a big share of applicants that were refused by loan officers, a sample of 
such applicants has to receive credit in order to obtain new experience on their credit 
behavior and incorporate it into a new algorithm. Before that, the current credit scoring 
algorithm should not be used as a sole screening method, but rather to complement the 
work of the loan officer. Algorithm’s robustness is confirmed using a representative test 
sample and a sample of rejected applicants. The algorithm’s economic significance is 
also estimated. If satisfactory, the credit scoring system is implemented and used in the 
process of screening loan applicants. Results of the use of credit scoring are regularly 
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verified through post-implementation reports, unless the algorithm is able to learn 
constantly from newly available experience. 
 
The population comprises subjects, individuals or businesses, which apply for loan 
products of the financial institution. The population should be homogeneous for 
statistical reasons and large for economical reasons. Equilibrium between these 
dimensions can be reached by adjusting the characteristics of available credit products 
and application policies. 
 
The definition of bad credit risks represents the rule used to identify credit risks to be 
avoided. Certainly the profitability of the loan is the best indicator to classify it as good 
or bad credit risk, but delinquency serves as a good proxy used extensively in 
identifying bad risks. 
 
The profile of the applicant represents the required information on the subject applying 
for a credit. This can accommodate five categories: socio-demographic variables (for 
personal and small business loans), business-demographic variables (for business loans, 
including small business), financial information, information about the required loan 
product, and past credit behavior. 
 
Statistical multivariate analysis is at the core of credit scoring. Different techniques are 
proposed and all are empirical. This represents the big advantage over judgmental-
intuitive reasoning of loan offices and credit rating tools. 
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The algorithm tells the user, human or machine, how to proceed to estimate the 
classification of the applicant as good or bad credit risk. The accuracy of the estimation 
is known. The algorithm includes the precise rules for accepting or rejecting the 
applicant. In non-parametric algorithms the cut-off is predetermined, while in 
parametric algorithms the cut-off is fixed based on the scoring distribution and 
economic calculations, such as evaluation of misclassification costs. 
 
The ethics of using credit scoring may raise legal concerns about the information used 
by the algorithm or moral concerns about the refusal of credit to otherwise creditworthy 
applicants who are considered bad by credit scoring. In microfinance the opportunity 
cost of not serving a good client is much higher than in most other credit segments. 
Similarly, over indebting a micro borrower has high opportunity costs. Credit scoring 
replaces the subjective judgement of the loan officers with empirics, thus reducing 
ethical issues.  
 
Conclusions 
Our review shows that outlines of the conceptual framework of credit scoring date back 
to late 1930s in the USA. In the post-Great Depression period, the practice of using 
judgmental rating systems based on the experience and intuition of loan officers was not 
uncommon. In this context Durand pioneered the use of statistical methods in 
identifying credit risk factors in consumer financing. His research set up the pillars of 
the framework of the credit scoring technique and opened the way for further research. 
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The resemblance between the debate described by Durand and current post-crisis 
debates in microfinance reveals important findings for microfinance institutions. This 
literature review and the enclosed analysis of actions and reactions that led to the 
current framework of credit scoring provide many lessons for the microfinance sector. 
 
In 1958, FICO registered the sale of the first credit scoring system. Currently 95 percent 
of the largest financial institutions in the US are FICO clients (Fair Isaac Corporation, 
2017). Nevertheless, the commercial success of FICO did not benefit the academic 
literature until recent publications (Oliver & Wells, 2001; Hand & Kelly, 2002; Zhu et 
al., 2002) brought to light the results of its best practices and research findings. 
 
Today, credit scoring is not in widespread use in microfinance, just as it was not in 
extensive use in the USA in the early 1960s, although the traits of the conceptual 
framework of modern consumer credit scoring were established and publicly available 
by 1964. With the expansion of the technique in consumer lending, Altman was the first 
to extend the use of credit scoring to corporate financing. 
 
The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 added legitimacy to credit scoring in the 
USA, which by the beginning of the 1970s had become a recognized industry. The 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 marked a new stage in the history of the 
conceptual framework of credit scoring by prohibiting discrimination in credit granting 
practices on the basis of identities such as ethnicity and gender. Incorporation of such 
attributes in credit scoring algorithms was forbidden. To the extent that these factors 
were statistically significant, their exclusion reduced the accuracy of bad credit risk 
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estimation, unless new risk factors could either compensate the lost accuracy or act as 
proxies for outlawed factors. 
 
Along with the dynamic expansion of credit scoring in consumer lending, small 
business financing appeared as the next credit segment with potential for the diffusion 
of the technique. However, fears that commercial lending was not as homogeneous as 
consumer credit kept academics and practitioners away. It was only in 1995 that FICO 
in partnership with Robert Morris Associates started to offer pooled data credit scoring 
for small businesses. This technique allowed a dynamic algorithm construction based on 
clusters of good and bad companies similar to the SME to be scored. 
 
By the end of the century in the developed world the credit scoring technique was 
commonly used in granting consumer and small business credit. Simultaneously 
academics and practitioners started looking for credit risk evaluation techniques for 
developing countries. Viganò’s work proposing the application of credit scoring for 
evaluating small and micro firms in Burkina Faso was a pioneering development in the 
literature. Schreiner’s work is most significant in extending the use of credit scoring to 
microfinance. 
 
The consolidated conceptual framework of the credit scoring technique, which we 
developed on the basis of our critical review of literature, can be applied to personal, 
retail, mortgage, micro, small, medium, corporate and other new loan markets. This 
framework can enable both practitioners and academics to address their different 
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approaches to the subject of credit scoring, especially the subject of the application of 
the credit scoring technique in microfinance. 
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